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On 26 May 2021, the District Court of the Hague rendered a judgment in the case
Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell that can rightly be called revolutionary. This is
the first judgment of its kind in which a multinational corporation is held responsible,
in part based on international law, for its contribution to climate change. While of
course we have to await the appeal, that no doubt will be filed by Shell, the potential
effects for Shell and for similar corporations are significant.
In this comment, I reflect on this judgment from the perspective of international
law. While the judgment is grounded in Dutch tort law – and many aspects call for
an analysis from the perspective of corporate governance – the international law
aspects of the judgment deserve attention. I focus on two aspects that transcend
the peculiarities of Dutch law and that may serve as a source of inspiration for
litigation elsewhere. The first aspect is the role of international law in shaping Shell’s
obligations (2); the second aspect is the Court’s approach to the question on how
Shell’s responsibility related to that of other actors, to its shared responsibility (3).
However, first, I will briefly summarize the facts and main holding (1).
1. Facts and holding
The case was brought as a public interest class action by Milieudefensie (the Dutch
branch of Friends of the Earth International) on behalf of itself and 17,379 individual
claimants, and six other NGOs. Based on the test for class actions set forth in the
Dutch Civil Code (Book 3 Section 305a), the Court found that plaintiffs could bring
a class action in the common interest of preventing dangerous climate change,
since the interests of current and future generations of Dutch residents ‘are suitable
for bundling so as to safeguard an efficient and effective legal protection of the
stakeholders’ (par. 4.2.4.). However, the Court rejected claims in the interests of
current and future generations of the world’s population; these claims would not be
suitable for bundling since ‘there are huge differences in the time and manner in
which the global population at various locations will be affected by global warming
caused by CO2 emissions’ (par. 4.2.3).
The defendant, Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), is a public limited company established
under the laws of England and Wales with its head office in The Hague, and the
parent company of the Shell group which develops activities worldwide. The District
Court determined that as the top holding company, RDS establishes the general
policy of the Shell group (par 2.5.1 and par 4.4.4).
The Court found that the total emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) of the Shell
group exceeded the emissions of many states, including the Netherlands and that
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their global CO2 emissions contribute to global warming and climate change in
the Netherlands, and the Wadden region (par. 4.4.5). It also found that this had
significant risks for residents of the Netherlands, in the form of health risks and
deaths due to climate change-induced hot spells, as well as health problems and
an increased mortality risk due to increasing infectious diseases, deterioration of
air quality, increase of UV exposure, an increase of water-related and foodborne
diseases, as well as water-related health risks, which the Netherlands and the
Wadden region will face, including flooding along the coast and rivers, excess water,
water shortage, deterioration of water quality, salinization, raised water levels and
drought (par. 4.4.6). These risks were relevant both in terms of standing, and in
terms of the eventual assessment of human rights (more about that below).
Against this background, the case then revolved around the question whether or not
RDS had an obligation to reduce CO2 emissions of the Shell group’s entire energy
portfolio (par. 4.1.1). The Court agreed with plaintiffs that RDS indeed had such an
obligation, holding
• that RDS is obliged to reduce the CO2 emissions of the Shell group’s activities
by net 45% by the end of 2030 relative to 2019 through the Shell group’s
corporate policy (par 4.1.4 and par. 4.4.55),
• that ‘the policy, policy intentions and ambitions of RDS for the Shell group’ imply
‘an imminent violation of this obligation’, and
• that therefore the Court allowed the claimed order for compliance with this legal
obligation (par. 4.5.3).
While granting this part of the claim, the Court rejected claims relating to the current
unlawfulness (since the arguments of the plaintiffs related to the policy for 2030) and
the unlawfulness of future actions of Shell (since RDS is in the process of adapting
its policy) (par. 4.5.10).
2. How international law was relevant to Shell’s
responsibility
The judgment was only indirectly based on international law. The claim by
Milieudefensie was primarily based on Dutch tort law. In this regard, in a first step,
the Court agreed that Dutch law was the applicable law, after an interpretation of art
7 of Regulation  864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligation (Rome
II), holding that the adoption of the corporate policy of the Shell group constitutes an
independent cause of the damage in terms of this regulation, which may contribute
to environmental damage and imminent environmental damage with respect to
Dutch residents (par. 4.3.6).
Given the applicability of Dutch law, the answer to the question whether RDS had a
CO2 reduction obligation then was grounded in the standard of care as developed
in Dutch case law based in tort as held in Book 6 Section 162 Dutch Civil Code. The
standard stipulates that ‘acting in conflict with what is generally accepted according
to unwritten law is unlawful’.
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It is this standard that opened the door to international law: RDS must observe the
due care exercised in society (4.41), and what due care is to be exercised in society
depends on a range of factors that may include international law. This argument
as such is not new (see my 2000 piece Public international law in transnational
litigation against multinational corporations: prospects and problems in the courts of
the Netherlands), but the Court gave it a particular extensive application. Three steps
in this interpretative process stand out.
First, the Court held that due care required Shell to comply with international human
right obligations. This did not mean that Shell had direct obligations under human
rights law. The Court found that the right to life and the right to respect for private
and family life of Dutch residents under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) apply in relationships between states
and citizens, and that Milieudefensie could not directly invoke these human rights
with respect to RDS. However, it also found that ‘due to the fundamental interest
of human rights and the value for society as a whole they embody, the human
rights may play a role in the relationship between Milieudefensie and RDS’ and that
therefore ‘the court will factor in the human rights and the values they embody in its
interpretation of the unwritten standard of care’ (par. 4.4.9).
In its interpretation of the relevance of human rights, the Court followed the
groundbreaking Urgenda judgment, where the Dutch Supreme Court found that
art. 2 and 8 ECHR offer protection against the consequences of dangerous climate
change due to CO2 emissions induced global warming, also referring to the practice
of the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights (par. 4.4.9).
Second, in its interpretation of the unwritten standard of care, the Court followed the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP), which it found to
‘constitute an authoritative and internationally endorsed ‘soft law’ instrument setting
out the responsibilities of states and businesses in relation to human rights.’ (par.
4.4.11). This part of the judgment will be of much interest for those studying human
rights responsibilities of corporations. While the Court noted that the UNGP ‘do not
create any new right, nor establish legally binding obligations’, they ‘are suitable as
a guideline in the interpretation of the unwritten standard of care’ (par. 4.4.11). In
this context, the Court gave a particular sweeping interpretation to the scope of such
obligations, as it held that ‘the responsibility to respect human rights encompasses
the company’s entire value chain’ and that this includes the end-users of the
products produced and traded by the Shell group (par. 4.4.18) at the end of RDS’
value chain.
This aspect of the judgment has drawn particular attention (and on the side of RDS,
concern). In effect this meant that RDS had a ‘best efforts’ obligation and had to take
the necessary steps to remove or prevent the serious risks ensuing from the CO2
emissions generated by its business relations, and to use its influence to limit any
lasting consequences as much as possible (4.4.55).
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Third, in construing the scope of RDS’s reduction obligation (what did RDS need
to do to prevent dangerous climate change?) the Court relied on the 2015 Paris
Agreement. The Court found that the goals of the Paris Agreement represent
the best available scientific findings in climate science, supported by widespread
international consensus and therefore were relevant in the interpretation of the
unwritten standard of care (4.4.27). It then found that the goals of the Paris
Agreement are derived from the IPCC reports (4.4.27) and that these reports support
the conclusion that the appropriate reduction target is a net 45% reduction of CO2
emissions in 2030, relative to 2010 levels. It is these reduction pathways that ‘offer
the best possible chances to prevent the most serious consequences of dangerous
climate change’ (par. 4.4.29). The Court emphasized that this does not formulate a
legally binding standard for RDS, but that this broad consensus was relevant in its
interpretation of the unwritten standard of care (par. 4.4.29).
To buttress the conclusion that the Paris goals were legally relevant for RDS, the
Court found it relevant that under the Paris Agreement, the signatories ensured
support of non-state stakeholders (2.4.7). The Court left unanswered the question
whether RDS could be designated as a ‘non-Party stakeholder’ in the terms referred
to by the Climate Ambition Alliance established at the Conference of the Parties
in Madrid in 2019 (COP 25) but simply found that the signatories emphasized that
the reduction of CO2 emissions and global warming cannot be achieved by states
alone and that there was broad international consensus about the need for non-state
action (par. 4.4.26).
Together with a range of other interpretative factors, the Court then concludes that
the human rights standards, the UNGP and the Paris agreement all support the
conclusion that RDS should be ordered to reduce the CO2 emissions of the Shell
group’s activities by net 45% at end 2030 relative to 2019 through the Shell group’s
corporate policy.
3. How is Shell’s responsibility related to
responsibility of other actors
One line of defense of RDS that is of wider relevance was that it was only one of
many contributors to climate change. This echoed the argument of the Dutch State
in Urgenda that the problem of climate change is caused by contributions of a large
number of states and other actors, that the Dutch proportion in global emissions
is negligible, and Dutch reductions therefore are not the sole cause of the global
problem of climate change. The Supreme Court in Urgenda rejected this argument,
holding that the Netherlands was subject to its own independent obligations and
thereby bound to do its part to prevent harmful climate change, as defined by these
obligations.
The District Court’s approach in the Shell case is comparable. RDS argued that
that the energy transition must be achieved by society as a whole, not by just one
private party. The Court agreed that ‘dangerous climate change is a worldwide
problem, which RDS cannot solve on its own’, that cooperation by different actors is
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required, and that ‘the division of responsibility among the various actors are points
of attention’ (4.4.52). However, it found that this does not in any way reduce the
obligation or responsibility of RDS.
Indeed, the Court even uses the fact that RDS was only one of many actors even to
justify its holding that RDS not only had obligations for its own emissions but also for
emissions of suppliers and end-users (par. 4.4.33). So, the fact that multiple parties
contribute in effect adds to, rather than reduces, the obligation of RDS.
More generally, the Court found that given the ‘broad international consensus that
each company must independently work towards achieving net zero emissions by
2050’, RDS may be expected to do its part (par. 4.4.36). The fact that RDS is not
the only party responsible for tackling dangerous climate change in the Netherlands
did not absolve RDS of its individual partial responsibility to contribute to the fight
against dangerous climate change according to its ability. (par. 4.4.37). Here it was
relevant that the emissions of RDS were not minor at all, as the Court considered
that RDS ‘is the policy-setting head of the Shell group, a major player on the fossil
fuel market and responsible for significant CO2 emissions, which incidentally exceed
the emissions of many states’ (par. 4.4.37). Hence, RDS must do its part with
respect to the emissions over which it has control and influence. It is an individual
responsibility that falls on RDS.
4. Conclusion: shared responsibility on climate
change
This is yet another judgment by a Dutch court that covers new ground and opens
new avenues, following such high profile judgments in cases relating to Srebrenica,
Indonesia, and the Urgenda judgment. While there are many Dutch judgments that
are more conservative, this is again a show of courage in Dutch Courts to address
controversial issues with wide ramifications, head on.
The judgment is rather sweeping, not a-typical for a District Court, in which the Court
sometimes makes bold assertions and at times even cuts corners. At several places,
upon quick reading an observer may wonder how the Court got from A to B. Surely
the pronouncements on the scope of RDS’s obligations, in particular in relation to the
end users, may proof controversial.
The dust on what the judgment means in practice still has to settle. How can RDS
comply with the obligations to cut its own emissions  – here reduction of the leakage
of methane and curbing the practice of flaring might be options. But disinvestment
in Shell’s activities also has been mentioned as a necessary option. Even more
complex is the question what RDS can do (under its best-efforts obligation) to reduce
emissions by suppliers (should RDS pressure them?) and end-users, including use
of cars and planes. It is thought that this accounts for 85% of all RDS emissions.
Supply of green energy is an obvious path, but at what costs?
Be this as it may, the approach of the Court to the international legal position of
corporations is less sweeping. It took a rather reserved position on the international
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legal obligations of multinational corporations, emphasizing that human rights did
not apply directly, that the UNGD did not establish hard law, and that the Paris
agreement was not binding for corporations.
The legal implications of international norms for RDS were fully grounded on the
open norm in Dutch tort law, which enabled “reading international law into” the
standard of due care as based on the Dutch civil code. While Urgenda brought in
reduction targets in the interpretation of human rights obligations, this Court takes
a short cut and uses the targets to interpret due care obligation. This, of course, is
a peculiarity of Dutch law, but then again it is a common practice of courts in many
states to interpret open norms of national law in the light of international law (see
chapter 7 of my National Courts and the International Rule of Law). In this respect
this reasoning may well be of wider relevance.
Even so, this approach raises fundamental questions. Surely there are limits to the
possibility to read international law norms, and certainly soft law, into open norms of
national law. One question is the relative power of courts to use non-binding norms
to fill in open provisions of Dutch law. In this regard, we might be reminded of the
Australian Teoh case, which caused some backlash in stating that if international law
norms are not brought in through the front door by Parliament, it is not for a Court to
bring them in through the backdoor. However, it should be observed that in this case,
the Court’s approach was highly contextual, and that the international law norms
were only a few out of many elements that eventually gave meaning to the due care
standard.
And then there is the question whether there are limits to the degree in which a Court
can or should give domestic binding effect to norms or targets that internationally
were not meant to be binding. In our blogpost of Urgenda, we recalled that almost
40 years ago, Prosper Weil noted that there is no warrant for considering that ‘by
dint of repetition, non-normative resolutions can be transmuted into positive law
through a sort of incantory effect: the accumulation of non-law or prelaw is no more
sufficient to create law than is trice nothing to make something’ (p. 417). On this
point one might say that since the Supreme Court in Urgenda had already found the
standards stipulated by COPs relevant for the interpretation of the ECHR, it was not
a big step to use them to interpret a due care standard under domestic law. Still, the
relationship between norms that intentionally were not binding internationally and are
given binding effect domestically (even if indirectly) is an uneasy one.
While it is true that the Court read a lot into a due care standard, one may also
reverse the perspective. Would it not be odd to say that RDS would act with due care
if it were to contribute emissions in a manner that interferes with human rights, so
as to make it more difficult or impossible to achieve targets set by States, certainly
given the fact that RDS emissions exceed those of many States?
The interpretative approach to international law allowed the court to come to highly
relevant findings on the individual responsibility of RDS. The judgment is a very
useful contribution to the developing body of law relating to shared responsibility
in international law. While the recent Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility
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in International Law focus on states and international organizations, this judgment
shows how the same reasoning extends to private actors.
We can infer from the judgment that the responsibility of RDS is a shared one with
that of many actors. For it is only the combination of conduct of all actors that lead to
harmful climate change. But this sharing of responsibility does not mean that in any
way the responsibility of individual actors (states or non-states) is diluted: each actor
remains responsible for its own conduct and has to perform its own obligation that
aims to prevent harmful effects. On the assumption that an actor has an independent
obligation (as the Court found to be the case for RDS) there is no hiding behind
others, no room for blame games, no space to pass the buck. Quite apart from the
peculiarities of Dutch law, and how the Netherlands can receive international law and
soft law in its private law norms, this conclusion will hopefully find its way into climate
change litigation worldwide.
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